




Expertise is in the Eye of the Beholder – Financial Advisor Evaluations  
and Client Satisfaction as a Result of Advisor Recommendations  
Abstract: Clients’ satisfaction with financial advice provided by professional advisors depends on how this advice has 
fulfilled their expectations and goals. However, once a recommendation is made, a client is unable to predict and 
evaluate the real financial outcome of the advisor’s proposal. In such a case, she/he can base her/his assessment on the 
characteristics ascribed to the financial advisor: her/his epistemic authority (competence) and level of caring. 
Additionally, clients expect to receive a “tailor-made” solution that takes into account her/his individual needs and 
characteristics. In the present study, we asked participants to evaluate financial experts who had recommended risky 
vs safe investments. The recommendations were congruent or incongruent with the clients’ risk tolerance (high vs low). 
The kind of recommendation influenced the participants’ evaluations of the advisors (and as a result, the clients’ 
perceived satisfaction) only for low-risk tolerance clients. For these clients, investment recommendations that were not 
adjusted to their levels of risk tolerance led to lower evaluations of the advisors and consequently to lower evaluation of 
satisfaction with their visits. These lower evaluations regarded both dimensions: the interpersonal aspect (caring) and 
competence in the field of finance (epistemic authority). Such incongruence between risk tolerance and the riskiness of 
the recommendation did not affect high-risk tolerance clients’ advisor evaluations. 
Keywords:  client satisfaction, risk tolerance, professional competence, agency and communion, epistemic authority 
Introduction  
Client satisfaction is often defined as the outcome 
perceived by those whose expectations and goals have 
been fulfilled by a company’s performance. The lesson is 
that firms should strive to meet clients’ needs and requests 
(Angelova & Zekiri, 2011). However, what about real-life 
practice? Studies of European supervisory organizations 
have revealed that one of the main problems in financial 
advice services is the poor quality of product recommen-
dation. In 2011, the marketing research agency Synovate 
Ltd. prepared for the European Commission report about 
financial advice and its quality and reliability across the 
European Union (Synovate, 2011). The scope of this study 
was to investigate whether advisors provide suitable 
advice to their clients. The study’s results revealed that 
57% of recommended products were unsuitable to clients’ 
needs and, interestingly, that over 80% of unsuitable 
advice was driven by a level of investment risk of 
recommended products that was too high. These data show 
that even though advisors knew clients’ individual 
characteristics and were aware of their needs, they did 
not follow this information. Hence, they recommended 
unsuitable products featuring too high a level of risk for 
clients’ coping capacities. The aim of our study was to 
investigate the consequences of recommending financial 
products that do not account for clients’ risk tolerance 
level. Specifically we wanted to test the influence of such 
incongruent (vs congruent) recommendation on the 
evaluation of the financial advisor’s credibility and then 
client satisfaction with the visit. 
The influence of advisor’s credibility on client’s 
satisfaction with the visit and the advice  
The previous research in health and economic 
psychology showed that client satisfaction and his/ her 
willingness to fulfill the advisor’s recommendation largely 
depend on two interrelated factors – advisor’s credibility 
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and congruency between his/her recommendation and 
client’s preferences (Kicia & Muda, 2018; Philips, 2007; 
Polinsky, et. al., 2014). The advisor credibility is a combi-
nation of two dimensions: the first dimension is the 
evaluation of advisor’s epistemic authority in a given 
domain (Kruglanski, 2010; Kruglanski, et.al, 2005), and 
the second dimension is the perceived level of caring that 
she/he demonstrates towards the client (Eisend, 2006; 
Sniezek&van Swol, 2001). 
The concept of the advisor’s epistemic authority (EA) 
is derived from lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski, et al. 
2005) which describes the process of knowledge forma-
tion. EA is used to refer to subjective beliefs about 
a source of knowledge or expertise (for a review, see 
Kruglanski, 2012). In the lay epistemology framework, the 
EA functions as the “stopping mechanism”. It affects the 
cessation of the hypothesis generation sequence and 
crystallization of confident knowledge. The high EA 
may be so powerful that it can override other information 
and exert the determinative influence on individuals’ 
opinions and corresponding behaviors (Kruglanski, et. al., 
2005; Kruglanski, 2012; Kruglanski, Orehek, Dechesne 
& Pierro, 2010). In this light, attributing high EA to 
financial advisor may increase the client’s certainty and 
satisfaction with the financial recommendation and his/her 
willingness to follow it without testing it or considering 
other alternatives. 
While the EA comprises the level of knowledge 
which the clients attribute to a financial advisor, the 
second dimensions of advisor’s credibility is his/her 
perceived level of caring about the client. It refers to the 
extent to which an advisor is perceived as sincere, honest 
and supportive and it stems from the belief that the advisor 
is willing to honestly pass on her/his knowledge while 
keeping the client’s best interests in mind (Sniezek 
& vanSwol, 2001). The importance of this dimension for 
persuasion effectiveness and advice utilization has been 
repeatedly emphasized and demonstrated in many different 
theories and studies in the context of persuasion (Petty 
& Caccioppo, 1986; Riechelt, Sievert & Jacob, 2014, 
Wiener & Mowen, 1986), social perception (Abele 
& Wojciszke, 2014) and the judge and advisor relationship 
(Sniezek & vanSwol, 2001). It has also been included by 
marketing and management researchers in the construct of 
customer orientation, which is considered an important 
leverage for service firms’ economic success (Hennig- 
-Thurau, 2004). 
For some advisors there are some objective cues that 
clients may use to evaluate their credibility. For example, 
when patients have to judge the authority of physicians, 
they might base their evaluations on such evidence as 
professional title, academic degree or the place in the 
organizational hierarchy. However, clients who search for 
financial advisor do not have access to clear cues 
informing about his/her credibility. The higher education 
or scientific degree is not required to practise this 
profession and there is no equivalent of a Hippocratic 
oath that defines the ethical standards in financial advising. 
Therefore lay people have to rely on more indistinct 
attributes when evaluating the credibility of financial 
advisors. The previous studies in economic psychology 
showed that these attributes may be connected to some 
characteristics of advisor’s recommendation, especially to 
its congruence with client’s preferences (Zaleskiewicz, 
et. al 2016a; Zaleskiewicz, et al., 2016b). 
Financial advice and its congruence  
with clients’ individual characteristics  
Recent economic psychology research (Zaleskiewicz, 
et.al. 2016, a,b; Zaleskiewicz, Gasiorowska, 2018) has 
demonstrated that congruence (or incongruence) of a re-
commendation provided by the financial advisor regarding 
the client’s preferences may strongly influence the 
evaluation of advisor’s credibility. In these studies 
participants ascribed greater EA to an advisor who 
recommended accepting the financial product (insurance 
or investment in stock market) when they held a positive 
opinion of the product. Instead, participants with a ne-
gative opinion of the product tended to ascribe greater EA 
to an advisor who suggested rejecting it (Zaleskiewicz, et 
al. 2016 a,b, Zaleskiewicz & Gasiorowska, 2018). The 
authors of these studies speculate that the obtained results 
may reflect the strategy to defend self – worth challenged 
by the disconfirming recommendation. They also refer to 
the naïve realism, which motivates people to attribute 
greater EA to the advisors who confirmed their opinion 
because they perceived them as better informed and less 
biased (Zaleskiewicz & Gasiorowska, 2018). However, we 
assume that another explanation (that doesn’t rule out the 
previous ones), which refer to advisors’ social role, is also 
possible. People expect advisors to give tailor made 
solutions (because they expect them to have enough 
knowledge to do it) and act in the client’s best interests. 
Then the advisor who takes into account the client’s 
preferences or individual characteristic is ascribed a higher 
level of EA and caring. This assumption is well established 
among marketers who underlie that taking into considera-
tion the client’s needs increases her/his trust and the level 
of mutual understanding, which translates into higher 
client’s satisfaction, and consequently into the profit for 
company (Helgesen, 2006; Saxe & Weitz, 1982; Yeung 
& Ennew, 2000).  
However, is the financial advice pattern convergent 
with the foundations of client satisfaction? As Snelbecker, 
Roszkowski and Cutler (1991) observed over 20 years ago, 
financial service professionals mostly refer to investment 
products rather than to clients’ individual characteristics. 
These findings were observed by financial authorities and 
law regulations. In consequence the advisors were 
instructed to follow the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID; European Commission, 2007), which 
regulates European Union law in the domain of investment 
services. According to the MiFID, before giving a re-
commendation, an advisor has to identify the client’s 
financial situation and investment experience, as well as 
the client’s investment objectives, with particular con-
sideration of the client’s preferences regarding risk taking. 
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However, the research showed that despite of MiFID 
regulations, financial advisors still gather little information 
about clients’ individual characteristics such as her/his risk 
tolerance or even having this information they don’t follow 
it (Chitra & Sreedevi, 2011; Huang & Zeelenberg, 2012). 
In consequence they recommend financial solutions that 
are not suitable for the clients (as we mentioned at the 
beginning – usually with too high level of risk). 
Taking into account these financial markets’ studies 
on the one hand and the aforementioned studies in 
economic psychology on the other, we wanted to 
investigate how the incongruency between the information 
about client's risk tolerance and the financial advisor's 
recommendation influences the evaluation of advisor 
credibility, and client’s satisfaction with the visit. Speci-
fically, the study first examines two general hypotheses: 
1) the moderating role of information about client risk 
tolerance on the relationship between the financial 
advisor’s recommendation and evaluation of client satis-
faction; 2) the moderating role of information about client 
risk tolerance on the relationship between the expert’s 
recommendation and the evaluation of the advisor’s 
credibility (the advisor’s EA in finance and level of caring 
about the client). Additionally, we tested the mediating 
role of the advisor’s perceived EA and level of caring 
about the client in the relationship between the advisor 
recommendation and client satisfaction. Assuming that 
information about client risk tolerance moderates the 
association between the advisor recommendation and the 
advisor’s perceived EA and caring about client, it is also 
likely that the information about client’s risk tolerance will 
conditionally influence the indirect relationship between 
the recommendation and perceived client satisfaction, 
thereby demonstrating a pattern of moderated mediation 
between the study variables (hypothesis 3). 
Method  
Participants and procedure  
The analyses were performed on a sample consisting 
of 149 participants (75 men, 74 women), aged 22–55 
years. They were recruited by interviewers from three 
universities. The mean age of our participants was 32.88, 
SD = 8.45. Participation in the study was voluntary, the 
participants were informed that they could withdraw at any 
moment. The study was described to them and their 
anonymity was assured. Afterward, their verbal consent 
was obtained. 
The participants were randomly assigned to one of 
two recommendation conditions (low risk investment vs 
high risk investment) and one of two information about 
client risk tolerance conditions (low risk tolerance vs high 
risk tolerance). Each questionnaire included a scenario 
describing a visit to a financial advisor. The procedure was 
adopted from previous research on the evaluation of 
experts (Bar-Tal, Stasiuk, & Maksymiuk, 2013; Stasiuk, 
Bar – Tal & Maksymiuk, 2016). The participants were 
asked to imagine that a friend was going to invest their 
savings and had decided to visit a financial advisor. The 
advisor compiled all of the information about the client’s 
financial situation and assessed the level of his risk 
tolerance (low vs. high). Then, the recommendation of the 
advisor was presented (low risk investment vs high risk 
investment). 
Measures  
Advisor EA was measured using six questions adapted 
from Barnoy, Ofra and Bar – Tal, (2012), (e.g., “To what 
extent do you think the advisor is an expert in the financial 
domain?”; “To what extent do you think that his/her 
arguments are totally correct?”). Each question was 
answered on a six-point scale. Cronbach’s alpha reliability 
was .92. 
Caring about the client was measured with two items 
(“Did the advisor try to help the client?”; “Does the 
advisor care about his/her clients?”) with answers on a six- 
-point scale. The items were adapted from previous studies 
on the perception of experts (Zaleskiewicz et al., 2016). 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability was .85. 
Perceived client satisfaction with the visit was 
assessed by asking the participants four questions about 
their opinions about perceived client satisfaction (e.g., 
“Would your friend be satisfied with the visit?”; “Would 
your friend recommend the advisor to other clients?”). 
Each question was answered on a six-point scale. 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability was .91.  
Data analysis  
The data were analyzed using PROCESS (Hayes, 
2013). Based on conceptual and theoretical considerations 
discussed in the introduction, we treated the recommenda-
tion of a high risk investment or low risk investment as the 
predictor variable, the advisor’s perceived EA and level of 
caring about the client as mediators, client satisfaction with 
the visit as the dependent variable, and the client’s risk 
tolerance as the moderator. This approach allowed us to 
test whether the influence of the investment recommended 
by the financial advisor on perceived client satisfaction 
with the visit was mediated by his/her perceived EA and 
caring. Additionally, this approach allowed us to further 
test whether the indirect relationship differed based on the 
client’s risk tolerance. 
To test for the described relationships, we used model 
8 (the moderated meditation test). The test included bias – 
corrected bootstrapping estimating indirect effects – by 
creating 5,000 bootstrap samples with replacement. The 
effects were determined to be significant if the associated 
95% confidence interval did not include zero. The 
conceptual model we tested is presented in Figure 1. 
Results  
Preliminary analyses  
First, a series of bivariate correlations were conducted 
between the independent variable (IV, recommendation), 
mediators (advisor EA and caring), moderator (information 
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about client risk tolerance) and dependent variable (DV, 
perceived client satisfaction). For correlations involving 
categorical data (recommendation and client risk tolerance, 
dummy coded), point-biserial correlation coefficients were 
applied. The remaining were calculated using Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients (because of the sample size, 
a normal distribution was assumed). Both mediators were 
highly correlated with the DV and moderately correlated 
with the IV. The moderator was not correlated with any 
remaining variables, including the DV. 
Main results  
In the first step, the moderating effect of the 
information about clients’ risk tolerance on the path 
between the IV (advisor recommendation) and the DV 
(perceived client satisfaction) was tested (Figure 2). The 
results revealed that the interaction term, information 
about client risk tolerance x recommendation, controlling 
for advisor EA and caring (mediators), was a significant 
predictor of perceived client satisfaction (B = .52, t = 2.14, 
p = 0.05). The nature of the moderating effect was that the 
advisor's recommendation was a significant predictor of 
perceived client satisfaction only for clients with low risk 
tolerance. The recommendation of a high-risk investment 
resulted in lower perceived satisfaction for low-risk 
tolerant clients than the recommendation of a low-risk 
investment (B = –.42, t = –2.34, p = .02). For information 
that the client was high-risk tolerant, the advisor's 
recommendation did not influence perceived satisfaction 
with the visit (B = .10, t = .62, n.s). The first hypothesis 
was confirmed. 
Figure 1. Theoretical Model 
Table 1. Basic De5scriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Recommenda-
tion (IV)      
2. Epistemic autho-
rity (Mediator 1) –.35**     
3. Caring  
(Mediator 2) –.35** .83**    
4. Tolerance for 
risk (Moderator) –.02 –.08 .09   
5. Satisfaction 
(DV) –.40** .85** .84** –.04  
M (Fraction) (.50) 3.28 3.44 (.48) 3.01 
SD – 1.24 1.33 – 1.29  
Note. N=149. For dichotomous variables fractions were calculated. ** p < 0,01 
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Then, the moderating effect of client risk tolerance on 
the path between the IV (advisor recommendation) and the 
mediators was tested (hypothesis 2). The results revealed 
that the interaction term, recommendation x client risk 
tolerance, was a significant predictor of advisor EA (B = 
1.87, t = 5.34, p < .001) (Figure 3). As outlined above, the 
advisor’s recommendation was a significant predictor of 
advisor EA only for clients with low risk tolerance. The 
recommendation of a high-risk investment with high 
returns resulted in lower advisor EA than the recommen-
dation of a low – risk investment (B = –1.77, t = –7.30, 
p < .001). The advisor's recommendation did not influence 
the evaluation of advisor EA for high-risk tolerance clients 
(B = .10, t = .41, n.s). 
The results also showed that the recommendation 
x information about client risk tolerance interaction was 
a significant predictor of perceived advisor caring about 
clients (B = 1.57, t = 4.05, p < .001) (Figure 4). Again, the 
nature of the moderating effect was that the advisor’s 
recommendation was a significant predictor of perceptions 
of advisor caring only when participants received informa-
tion that client was low risk tolerant. The recommendation 
of a high-risk investment resulted in the evaluation of the 
advisor as less caring about the client (B = –1.67, 
t = –6.23, p < .001). The advisor's recommendation did 
not influence perception of advisor caring, for participants 
who received information that client was high – risk 
tolerant (B = –.10, t = –.34, n.s.). These two significant 
moderating effects confirm the second hypothesis. 
In the last assumption (hypothesis 3), we predicted 
a moderated mediation effect, defined as the product of the 
conditional effect of the recommendation on the client’s 
perceptions of the advisor EA and caring as a function of 
client risk tolerance and the conditional effect of the 
recommendation on perceived client satisfaction as 
a function of client risk tolerance. Collectively, the 
predictors accounted for 74% of the variance in perceived 
client satisfaction. The direct effect of the recommendation 
on perceived client satisfaction was negative and sig-
nificant (B = –1.01, SE = .19, p < .001). 
The conditional mediation effect of the recommenda-
tion on EA, and client satisfaction was significant for low- 
risk tolerant clients (B = –.69, SE = .17, 95% CI [–1.07, 
–.37]) but not for high-risk tolerant clients (B = .04, 
SE = .11, 95% CI [–.18, .26]). For low-risk tolerant clients, 
the recommendation of a high-risk investment was 
associated with lower advisor EA, than the recommenda-
tion of a low – risk investment, which in turn decreased 
perceived client satisfaction. 
A similar pattern of results was obtained for the 
conditional mediation effect of the recommendation on 
perceived advisor caring and, in turn, client satisfaction. 
The effect was significant for low-risk tolerant clients 
(B = –.74, SE = .16, 95% CI [–1.09, –.46]) but not for 
high-risk tolerant clients (B = –.04, SE = .14, 95% 
CI [–.34, .23]). For low-risk tolerant clients, the recom-
mendation of a high-risk investment with high returns was 
associated with lower perceived advisor caring than the 
recommendation of a low – risk investment, which in turn 
decreased perceived client satisfaction. 
Following the procedure outlined by Hayes (2013) for 
testing the significance of moderated mediation effects, we 
estimated the difference between the abovementioned 
conditional mediation effects at high vs low levels of 
Figure 2. Conditional Direct Effect of the Advisor’s  
Recommendation on the Client’s Perceived Satisfaction 
Figure 3. Conditional Direct Effect of the Advisor’s  
Recommendation on the Advisor’s Epistemic Authority 
Figure 4. Conditional Direct Effect of the Advisor’s  
Recommendation on the Advisor’s Caring 
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client risk tolerance and tested whether this difference was 
significantly different from zero using bias-corrected 
bootstrapping. We found that the difference between the 
two conditional mediation effects was significant for both 
mediators: advisor EA (B = .73, SE = .21, 95% CI [.37, 
1.21]) and caring (B = .70, SE = .21, 95% CI [.34, 1.19]), 
providing evidence for a significant moderated mediation 
effect and confirming the 3rd hypothesis. 
Discussion  
The aim of the study was to investigate how 
laypeople evaluate financial experts who recommend risky 
vs safe investments to clients. Previous studies in 
economic psychology (Zaleskiewicz, et al. 2016, a, b) 
have shown that laypeople might form opinions about the 
credibility of financial advisors based not only on 
objective parameters (e.g., the advisor’s professional 
experience) but also on more subjective factors, such as 
the desire to confirm one’s own beliefs. In the present 
study, we wanted to further explore the influence of the 
financial advisor’s recommendation on the evaluation of 
her/his credibility. The idea of conducting this experiment 
not only developed as a continuation of previous research 
but also was inspired by the official guidelines for 
financial practice, i.e., the implementation of MiFID 
regulations. These regulations very clearly underline the 
importance of taking into account clients’ individual 
characteristics when recommending financial products, 
giving particular consideration to clients’ preferences for 
risk taking. 
Taking this into consideration in our research, we 
wanted to investigate whether the congruence between 
a financial advisor’s recommendation and a client’s risk 
tolerance would affect the evaluation of advisor credibility 
and the perceived client satisfaction with the visit. In our 
scenarios, the financial advisor recommended a high-risk 
investment with high returns or a low-risk investment with 
low returns to low- or high-risk tolerant clients. According 
to the analyses made by economic researchers (Ibbotson 
& Chen, 2003), it can be assumed that investing in a high- 
-risk investment with high returns (e.g., stocks) is more 
profitable than investing in a low-risk investment with low 
returns (e.g., T-bills). Thus, it appears that the advisor who                                      
Table 2. Regression Results for the Conditional Indirect Effect 
Variable 
Mediator 1 variable model 
B SE t p 
Step 1  
DV: Advisor’s Epistemic Authority   
CONSTANT   
Recommendation   
Risk Tolerance   
Recommendation X Risk Tolerance 

















Mediator 2 variable model 
B SE t p 
Step 2  
DV: Advisor’s Caring   
CONSTANT   
Recommendation   
Risk Tolerance   
Recommendation X Risk Tolerance 

















Dependent variable model 
B SE t p 
Step 3  
DV: Perceived Client’s Satisfaction   
CONSTANT   
Advisor’s Epistemic Authority   
Advisor’s Caring   
Recommendation   
Risk Tolerance   
Recommendation X Risk Tolerance 
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recommends the objectively more profitable investment 
should be assessed to be at least within the domain of her/ 
his financial knowledge. 
However, the results of our research showed that the 
advisor who recommended a high-risk investment with 
high expected returns to low-risk tolerant clients was 
evaluated as less credible, then the advisor who recom-
mended a low risk investment, which in turn negatively 
affected the client satisfaction evaluation. Interestingly, the 
advisor was evaluated lower on both dimensions – as less 
caring about the client but also as less knowledgeable in 
the financial domain. From the perspective of social 
cognition, advisor EA and caring about the client can be 
described as the representation of two broad classes of 
content universally present in the perception of others – 
agentic content and communal content. These fundamental 
dimensions are broadly discussed in the dual perspective 
model of agency and communion (DPM-AC, Abele 
& Wojciszke, 2014). Agentic content refers to goal 
achievement and task functioning (competence, decisive-
ness); in our study, this content is represented in the 
advisor’s EA. Communal content refers to the maintenance 
of relationships and social functioning (helpfulness, 
trustworthiness), and in our study, it is represented in the 
perception of the advisor’s level of caring about clients. 
According to the DPM-AC, agency and communion 
usually tend to be orthogonal. Agency traits tend to be 
self-profitable because they refer to attributes that allow 
trait possessors to effectively pursue their goals, and 
communal traits are other-profitable because they inform 
the perceiver about the attributes of the target that conveys 
her/his benevolent versus malevolent intentions (Peeters, 
2001; Abele & Wojciszke, 2014). From this point of view, 
the evaluation of the advisor who recommends a high-risk 
investment to low-risk tolerant clients as less caring is 
expected because the advisor offers the solution that may 
be potentially harmful to the client’s wellbeing. It must be 
noted that the recommendation of a high-risk investment is 
not a problem of potential economic loss (from a risky 
investment) because the same recommendation did not 
negatively influence the advisor’s credibility when pro-
vided to high-risk tolerant clients. This recommendation is 
a problem concerning the psychological ability to handle 
an investment loss that should be taken into account by the 
financial advisor (in order to be perceived as caring about 
the client). 
Our research showed that recommendation of a high- 
risk investment to low-risk tolerant clients could nega-
tively influence the client’s evaluation not only of the 
advisor’s level of caring but also the advisor’ EA in the 
financial domain, which in turn decreased the evaluation of 
client satisfaction. This result may indicate that for 
laypeople, the possession of expert knowledge in a given 
domain indicates the ability to find a tailor-made solution 
for a client. This explanation has also been confirmed in 
health psychology research (Stasiuk, et al., 2016). In this 
research, the physician (the advisor and expert in the 
health domain) who recommended treatment involving 
less painful procedures and shorter recovery time was not 
only evaluated to be more caring toward the patient but 
also ascribed higher EA in medicine. By extension of this 
logic, it could be speculated that although knowledge and 
professional skills are agentic and self-profitable features, 
expert knowledge has major other-profitable aspects. We 
hypothesize that these patern of results can be also 
explained by general impression model of halo effect. 
The model assumes that attribute ratings (here: advisor’s 
EA and level of caring) are influenced by a general 
impression – the source of common variance creates 
correlations among attributes (Graf & Unkelbach, 2016). 
In our research the general impression can be based on the 
immediate evaluation that advisor acts (or not) in the best 
interests of her/his client. 
The results presented in this paper also have 
important theoretical and practical implications in the 
financial service domain. They revealed that the correct 
assessment of clients’ risk tolerance cannot be ignored in 
ensuring clients’ satisfaction or in the formation of client- 
-oriented activities in the financial advising industry. 
Offering risky products to all clients may seem to be 
a tempting offer and is usually profitable in the short term 
for the advisor due to the high level of commission offered 
by the financial product issuer. Moreover, clients are 
usually not self-aware about their level of risk tolerance, 
and financial advising belongs to the service area, where it 
is hard to evaluate service quality from the perspective of 
clients even after they have experienced the service (Darby 
& Karni, 1973). Thus, advisors do not have an interest in 
educating their clients. During the financial advising 
process, the client has no chance to determine whether 
the proposed investment is the most promising alternative 
or offers the optimal level of risk tolerance because it is 
impossible to estimate the exact future outcome and 
volatility of his/her assets compared to other market 
opportunities. 
Furthermore, asymmetry between the client’s and the 
advisor’s financial knowledge forces the client to trust the 
advisor and rely on his/her judgments. The real outcome of 
financial advice unfolds over time, and it usually takes 
time to get to know its effects, so it is difficult for clients to 
assess service quality at first sight (Sharma & Patterson, 
1999) and for rival firms to convince clients that perceived 
utility and expectations may be biased. Moreover, naïve 
clients wrongly hold the belief that they will be unlikely to 
terminate a contract prematurely. In such cases, selling 
products based on biased advice and unfavorable refund 
and cancellation terms allows firms to generate the same 
perceived utility at a lower cost (Inderst & Ottaviani, 
2012). The above is far from a customer-oriented attitude 
and industry ethics standard; however, a moderated effect 
that was discovered by our study sheds new light on these 
activities. 
A limitation of this study may be the fact that data 
were collected using scenarios and may not reflect the 
actual impact of the examined factors on participants’ 
perceptions of advisors’ credibility. However, other studies 
that have used similar procedures and scenarios in the 
context of health psychology (Barnoy, et al. 2012; Bar-Tal 
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et al. 2013, Stasiuk, et al. 2016) as well as economic 
psychology (Zaleskiewicz et al. 2016, a,b) have found this 
method to be suitable (for a review, see also: Persky, 
Kaphingst, Condit, & McBride, 2007). 
Further studies could be designed to explore 
and compare the influence of the confirmation bias effect 
that has been found in previous studies (Zaleskiewicz, 
et al. 2016, a,b) with the effect of advice tailored to 
individual characteristics, such as clients’ risk tolerance, 
that we focused on in our study on financial advisor 
evaluations. Manipulating client preferences, client risk 
tolerance, and the recommended investment would create 
a condition in which the client prefers a high-risk 
investment that is inconsistent with her/his low level of 
risk tolerance. Higher evaluations of an advisor who 
recommends a high-risk investment (consistent with client 
preferences but inconsistent with client risk tolerance) 
would indicate the strength of confirmation bias. Higher 
evaluations of an advisor who recommends a safe 
investment (inconsistent with client preferences but 
consistent with client risk tolerance) would indicate the 
prevalence of a recommendation tailored to client risk 
tolerance. 
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